One of the main ideas of calculi of natural deduction, as introduced by Jaskowski and Gentzen, is that assumptions may be discharged in the course of a derivation. As regards sentential logic, this conception will be extended in so far as not only formulas but also rules may serve as assumptions which can be discharged. The resulting calculi and derivations with rules of any finite level are informally introduced in ?1, while ??2 and 3 state formal definitions of the concepts involved and basic lemmata. Within this framework, a standard form for introduction and elimination rules for arbitrary n-ary sentential operators is motivated in ?4, understood as a contribution to the theory of meaning for logical signs. ?1. Derivations with rules of higher levels-informal exposition. Assumptions in sentential calculi technically work like additional axioms. A formula a is derivable from formulas ,, f38 in a calculus 1' if a is derivable in the calculus @' resulting from W by adding fi1,... , An as axioms. But whereas "genuine" axioms belong to the chosen framework and are usually assumed to be valid in some sense, assumptions bear an ad hoc character: they are considered only within the context of certain derivations. When deriving ac from Ale... , f we do not want to change our framework and to extend the calculus 1'; we are interested in the derivability relation between I3,. .& Bn and ac with respect to W'. This ad hoc character of assumptions, as compared with axioms, is made obvious in natural deduction systems: some of their inference rules allow one to discharge assumptions used in the derivations of the premises-that means, such assumptions are used only in specific subderivations for the purpose of establishing a certain formula in the superior derivation. Whereas inference rules of a Hilbert-type system may be written as from the assumptions +, o (assumption formulas) and 000 (assumption rule). To the right of the lines it is indicated whether the formula immediately below the line is an assumption formula or obtained by application of an assumption rule (a?), or whether it is obtained by application of a basic rule that is an instance of 1 or M2. These indications however are considered to be only metalinguistic comments, and are not part of the notation itself.
inference rules in a calculus of natural deduction can be given as F1 Ln (2) I fln where the F's are finite lists of formulas representing the assumptions which may be discharged within the subderivations of the corresponding fly's by the application of this rule. A rule of form (1) can be considered to be a formula tree (growing upwards) of height 2, a rule of form (2) to be a formula tree of height 3 (provided not all F's are empty).
Instead of considering only ad hoc axioms (i.e. assumption formulas) we can also regard ad hoc inference rules, that is, inference rules of form (1) from the assumptions +, o (assumption formulas) and 000 (assumption rule). To the right of the lines it is indicated whether the formula immediately below the line is an assumption formula or obtained by application of an assumption rule (a?), or whether it is obtained by application of a basic rule that is an instance of 1 or M2. These indications however are considered to be only metalinguistic comments, and are not part of the notation itself.
The idea of assumption rules leads to an extension of natural deduction if we introduce inference rules allowing one to discharge assumption rules as well as assumption formulas. Such rules can be presented in form (2) where the F's may now contain rules of form (1) besides formulas; they may be considered formula trees of height 4 (provided at least one of the F's contains a rule of form (1) which is an instance of M3. A derivation depends on those assumption formulas occurring somewhere without a numeral to the left of the line immediately above it and on those assumption rules being applied somewhere without a numeral to the left of the line indicating this application. Both cases can be put into one if we consider assumption formulas a to be result of the application of an assumption rule a without premises. So from now on we shall use "assumption" and "assumption rule" synonymously. This procedure can be iterated: we may use rules of form (2) as assumption rules which are dischargeable by the application of rules of higher complexity, and so on. Rules are then arbitrary finite formula trees (growing upwards); their height will be called the level of the rule. This leads to a concept of derivation where all kinds of inference rules may be used as assumptions and may be discharged by the application of other rules. In particular, assumptions may be discharged by the application of assumption rules.
So formulas a are rules of level 1 (allowing one to infer a without premises), rules of form (1) would have been sufficient to establish this derivation. Furthermore, in which order the assumption rules which may be discharged (i.e. the members of the F's in (2)) are stated is not relevant for the application of this rule in a derivation. In order to capture this we shall define the notion of a subrule of a rule in such a way that each application of a subrule can be considered to be an application of the rule itself (e.g., (4) will denote a subrule of (3)). Moreover, an assumption that is actually used in a derivation and could be discharged by the application of a rule, need not be discharged at certain places or at any places at all. One could (but we do not) identify a rule with the set of its subrules (that would make rules which are subrules of each other identical).
Prawitz's concept of discharge functions is modified somewhat for our purposes. Discharge functions have as arguments not only top formulas of a formula tree. This definition follows the meaning we have assigned to a rule. However, derivability should be something that can be established by a derivation itself and not only by a procedure transforming derivations into derivations. The following lemma shows that this is the case. Sentential calculi for n-ary operators. We present a framework for the treatment of arbitrarily many sentential operators (in short: operators) of any number of argument places. That means, we do not present a specific calculus, but describe a language for a generalized sentential logic leaving the sentential operators themselves unspecified, and motivate a standard form for basic rules for these operators (again leaving the rules themselves unspecified). This standard form is justified by arguing that rules of this form give a meaning to the operator involved, i.e. we describe a semantical framework in the sense of the theory of meaning.
We assume finitely or denumerably many sentential operators to be given, each with an associated natural number ?0 as the number of its argument places, and furthermore infinitely many sentence letters. We use S and S' as syntactical variables for operators. All sentence letters are atomic formulas. Formulas As a limiting case we allow m to be 0. In that case the common content of 0 lists of rules consists of all rules p. This case will lead to intuitionistic logic with its characteristic absurdity rule. The concept of common content is a generalization of the concept of the logical content of a formula as the set of its logical consequences, as used e.g. by Tarski and Carnap (but whose roots go back at least to Frege).
We now assume that, with each n-ary operator S, m (m 2 0) lists of rule schemata are associated. The limiting case m = 0 means that no list is associated with S. S is then called a I-operator. Since the meaning of S will be determined by reference to the <Pi and thus to the operators occurring in the Pi, their meaning must be presumed to be already given. So we require that it must be possible to order the sentential operators in a sequence S1, S2, . That this is a correct inductive definition is due essentially to the requirement that the lists of rule schemata associated with S contain only operators preceding S in a certain enumeration of operators. rk(a) is not simply defined to be the number of operators in a, because one wants the rank to increase when an introduction rule is applied, and the formulas from which a is inferred by an introduction inference and rules discharged by this inference step may contain more and other operators than a. , who does not deal with the completeness of sets of operators, makes use of sequents of arbitrary levels to investigate logical systems with different assumptions about structural rules. Contrary to that, we have not questioned the structural assumptions underlying Gentzen-Prawitz-style natural deduction. Furthermore, Dosen allows operators to be introduced in and eliminated from the antecedent of a sequent, which does not fit in with our framework of natural deduction. Aside from these differences, the aim of Dosen's theory is quite distinct from ours. He is not concerned with questions of semantics or theories of meaning at all, but develops a criterion for the logicality of constants involved in alternative systems.
